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GDP in 2006
Dimitar Chobanov
The National Statistics Institute recently released
preliminary data for the gross domestic product
(GDP) in 2006. Apart from this, data since 2002
were revised leading to significant difference in
some indicators. The real growth rate of the
Bulgarian economy keeps its pace although there
is a slight deceleration since 2004.
The key precondition for the positive
development of GDP during the last few years is
the expanding of economic freedom. The
reforms virtually commenced in 1997. They
include privatizing state owned assets, especially
before 2000, liberalization of some industries,
reducing the control on prices and wages by the
government. Introduction of the currency board
provided stability of Bulgarian lev calming the
inflation expectations. The capital controls to
and out the country were removed thus giving
chance for larger capital inflows and foreign
investment. Labor market regulations were
relieved, the power of labor unions decreased
thus raising the flexibility.
The consequence of reforming was the fast
development in financial sector where the higher
competition led to supply of larger number and
more attractive products. The access to credit is
easier for the companies at more favorable
terms. As a whole, the efficiency of resource
allocation rose, which means higher
productivity, more chances for profits and
capital accumulation and real economic growth.
Of course, there are some factors which impact
on the growth rate and its long term potential is
negative. These are insufficient level of property
rights protection, complicated and expensive
procedures for collection of claims, declining
efficiency of public administration and
healthcare system, worsening quality of
education.
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The result of the central bank and government
policies and predominantly of the activities in
the private sector is 6.1% real growth of GDP in
2006. According to revised data, there is a slight
slow down relative to previous couple of years
when the real rate is 6.6% and 6.2% respectively
(it was 5.6% and 5.5% according to previous
data). The revision is for the period between
2002 and 2005 and changes are due to the
foreign trade data by the Bulgarian National
Bank as well as the reporting of adjustments
where a new methodology for indirectly
estimated services of the financial intermediaries
is applied (FISIM).
For three years in a row there is a real growth
rate exceeding 6%, which is the best result for
the Bulgarian economy since the beginning of
reporting. The growth rate of GDP per capita
also declined from 7.2% in 2004 to 6.8% in
2005 and 6.7% in 2006 and the real income per
person in the country is still about 1/3 of the EU
average.
The increase of gross value added (GVA) in real
terms is 6% in 2006 meaning that the trend is
reverse to the GDP. The rate is higher since
2003 (4.2%). The highest real growth rate in
2006 is in the industrial sector (8.3%), while in
services it is 6.1%. The reasons for this is the
higher investment in these sectors, favorable
conjuncture on the international markets,
especially for the heavy industries, and greater
competition in services.
As the climatic factors led to significant slump
in 2005, the expectations for 2006 were for
recovering of production in the agriculture given
the more favorable weather conditions. This did
not happen and the real decline is 1.9%. Some of
possible determinants are the insufficient level
of investment, small agriculture land parcels, the
lack of infrastructure for selling of production.
As a result the share of agriculture sector in the
GVA fell to 8.6%.
After the data revision there are no data for the
value added by the type of ownership thus
hampering the comparison. Previous data
unambiguously showed that the source of
growth for the economy was the private sector
where the productivity was higher and rising
while in public sector it was exactly opposite.
Such limitation of the scope of easily accessible
data is not recommendable but probably it is
done because of the implied lower efficiency of
the public sector.
Investment expressed by the gross capital
formation reached 31.9% of GDP, while the
gross savings are 16.2% of GDP. Therefore
savings from abroad are needed to finance
investment leading to a current account deficit.
Government policy for a budget surplus and the
policy of the central bank to restrict the growth
rate of crediting probably lead to lower inflation
but also to lower production of goods and
services. Public savings limit the possibility for
private ones by taking the resources from private
sector. Part of these savings were spent at the
end of 2006 which is reflected by the data.
During the first 9 months of the year, the
collective consumption was smaller than in 2005
in real terms by 1.1%, while in the last quarter of
2006 the real growth rate is 7.8% leading to a
growth of 1.7% for the whole year.
Lower efficiency of public spending than private
means that redistributed funds by the
government could find more productive use in
hands of their creators. In 2006 the opportunity
for significant reduction in tax burden was again
wasted which could have a positive impact on
the supply side of the economy. The reduction of
social security burden was 6 percentage points
had the expected effect but it was not sufficient.
The overall budget revenues were initially
underestimated leading to higher than expected
by the government revenues. The positive
development is in terms of budget spending
which share fell to 37.2% of GDP while it was
38.9% in 2005. Budget revenues had still a high
share of GDP 40.8%. Therefore, the government
redistributes large proportion of generated
income which is one of the limitations before the
higher long term growth potential.
Revised GDP data showed a picture for the
Bulgarian economy which is slightly different
from previous one. The real growth rate in 2006
is not the highest one but they are lower than in
2004 and 2005. Apart from this available data do
not allow comparison with years before 2002 as
they are not revised. Given that the analysis of
the current state of the economy and the past
development should be made cautiously. Still,
the broadened economic liberty is fruitful which
lead to higher long term growth and more
opportunities for investment and profits.
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New Ideas for the Bulgarian Economy
Svetla Kostadinova
In April 2007 the ruling socialist party
announced its new, corrected priorities for the
socio-economic development of Bulgaria for
2008. It is interesting to see the reactions of
some the members of the socialist party who
announced that they are not satisfied with the
proposed activities and will insist on corrections.
Reactions from other partners are various. The
trade unions cheered the idea of raising
minimum wage and child allowances, but
blamed the idea of privatization through the
stock exchange and decreasing of social
contributions. The rightwing parties declared
that those “new” priorities are just populism and
approach towards voters in the light of European
parliament elections in May.
Since citizens, business and investors art trying
to project what to expect, it is interesting and
useful to see what these priorities are.
1. Raising budget salaries each year by
10% in July combined with optimization
of administration – it is true that good
administration is those with sufficient
pay. But pay raise is possible only by
reducing the size of the civil servants in
Bulgaria and selection of those with
qualification and knowledge.
Unfortunately, recent developments of
state administration reform since 2005
show that respective ministers does not
cut their staff but insist on cutting
other’s. EU related appointment in
administration makes it even hard to
optimize Bulgarian administration.
2. Reduction of income tax and
continuation of decreasing the social
security burden over time – this is the
most important intention with overall
positive effect on the economy.
However, the targets are very low and
we doubt that any major difference will
happen. In fact, there are plans to
increase the maximum insurance
threshold which is at the moment 1 400
to 10 minimum wage. This means that if
the proposal for increasing minimum
wage to 200 leva is implemented the
threshold will reach 2 000 leva or 42%
increase. In other words, instead of
decreasing we have increase of tax
burden. This however is not presented in
such light and is hard for the people to
judge. In fact, this again confirms the
socialist believe that the state should
penalize those who risk, play and win in
the field of entrepreneurship.
3. Finishing the privatization – no doubt
this is a good intention and should have
been done years ago and therefore we
have state companies such as
Bulgartabac and Plovdiv airport (their
privatization has been delayed again last
week). What we cannot see however is
the combination of privatization and
liberalization in the economy.
4. Optimization of regulatory environment
– there is no ruling party or coalition in
Bulgaria that did not declared such
intentions. At the moment, the number
of real regimes is higher of those
permitted by law. Therefore, it would be
interesting to see what will be the true
effect of these intentions.
5. Rising of minimum wage – we have
wrote many times about its negative
effects, especially on workers with
lowest productivity than the minimum
wage. If employers asses the labor of an
employee to 160 leva for example but
the minimum wage is 200 leva there are
two options: (1) to hire the worker
illegally, or (2) not to hire the worker. In
both cases, the loss is for all parties – the
employer, employee and the state.
Therefore, the best option is to abolish
the minimum wage, and of this is not
viable in the short term future at least
restraining from raising it regularly.
6. Social policy – the proposals are for
increased child allowances, maternity
leave for fathers, one time child birth
payment increase, etc. What is not
understood by the socialist party is that
having a baby is pure personal decision.
One time payments can not be an
incentive for the society (except maybe
for certain groups) to have a child.
Rising of incomes is the only logical
incentive and it would matter for all.
Growth of economy through market
oriented reforms will raise incomes and
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thus stimulate people to think about
having more children.
7. Rising of health insurance contribution
from 6% to 8% - heavy regulated
healthcare sector in the country has been
recording steady deficits for years.
Giving more money will not solve the
problems. On the contrary.
8. Criminalization of not paying taxes and
social contributions – if one does not
receive quality services he will not pay
taxes or at least will not declare his real
income this trying to avoid payments to
the budget. The only way to stimulate
people to start paying is to reform the
social insurance system so bigger part of
paid contributions is collected in
people’s personal accounts.
Criminalization of non payment is going
to just raise the expenses of hiding from
the state.
Conclusion
We can see some change in socialist party logic
towards stimulation of business and citizens.
Such goals however are so low set that expected
effects would be minimal in comparison to
possible ones.
On the others hand, presented priorities are
moderate and do not show any ambition for
higher economic growth. And this is what
Bulgaria desperately needs.
The Concession of Plovdiv Airport has been
Cancelled – Why?
Adriana Mladenova
At the beginning of the month the Ministry of
Defense transferred its ownership share of
Plovdiv and Gorna Oriahovitza Airports to the
Ministry of Transport. According to the official
position of the resource ministries, this was the
first step from the procedure of giving under
concession the above-mentioned airports.
Concession of the airports is pointed out as a
priority in the long-term strategy for
development of transport infrastructure of
Bulgaria till 2015. This should mean that
economic and expert analyses have already been
prepared and there is a political will for
accomplishing that goal.
However, in the middle of August, the Bulgarian
press released information that the Ministry of
Transport has given up the idea to attract a
private investor into the project of modernization
and maintenance of Plovdiv Airport and the
government is going to finance the construction
of new terminals and gateways with money from
the budget. There is no justification to what is
due this unexpected turn in the intentions of the
politicians, an analysis or any other relevant
assessment of the potential effects of this
decision have not been presented before the
public. The only explanation that comes from
the officials is that the Ministry of Defense has
imposed seven conditions for the concession of
the airports. However, this is not new –
government officials were aware of these
conditions months ago, at the very start of the
negotiations for transferring of the ownership
between the ministries. A concession procedure
has never started, so the decision of the Minister
cannot be justified with a lack of interest from
potential investors. Then comes the question:
why has the concession been cancelled and what
stays behind this decision?
Investments in the Plovdid Airport are more than
necessary at this moment, when there is a
growing interest from airplane operators and
low-budget companies that are entering the
domestic market and are very active after the
liberalization of the air transport in the country
due to the Bulgaria’s accession to the EU. The
passenger gateway of Plovdiv Airport does not
meet the international and EU standards, and it
is currently operating only freight flights.
The cancellation by the Ministry to give the
airport under concession means that the
government will spend money of the taxpayers
in order to modernize the airport. Facts, history
and theory unambiguously show that when the
government manages an asset, the resources are
not used most efficiently and effectively. The
reason for this is trivial – people are rational and
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as such, they pursue their own interests. While in
the private sector the interests of the
entrepreneurs coincide with the goal of profit
maximization, meeting of long-term objectives
for attracting clients and achieving sustainable
results, the incentives of managers of state-own
enterprises and politicians differ substantially –
they are most concerned with the number of the
potential voters, the political environment and
opportunity for personal benefit from realization
of public projects.
Thus, we are again facing the lack of
transparency in decision-making by government
officials. The money, that are going to be spent
on modernization of the airport infrastructure,
are taken from taxpayers and they have the right
to know why is their money allocated to projects
that could be financed from other sources and,
what is more, better results could be achieved.
This decision also negates the strategy for
development of the infrastructure in the country
and indirectly proves that writing of “wishful”
strategy documents bears costs (financed with
taxes), but fails to show off the true intentions of
political leaders.
According the timetable for the development of
airport infrastructure in the country, that are
provided in detail as an annex to the strategy, the
following phases should be undertaken:
1) Till July 2007 – transferring the
government ownership from the
Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of
Transport;
2) Till December 2007 – negotiations with
TADO AG about the possibility of
taking concession of the airport and
solving any problems with the
ownership;
3) Till May 2009 – preparation of
documents for concession and
announcing a tender;
4) Till August 2009 – opening the
concession tender;
5) Till October 2009 – signing the
concession contract and taking
possession.
 The sudden change at the very beginning of the
realization of the schedule reveals a lack of
coordination and coherence in policy-making by
different government authorities, pursuing of
special interests that are not publicly revealed.
According to the Private Participation in
Infrastructure (PPI) Project Database of the
World Bank that provides analysis and follows
the trends of the developing world in private
sector participation in infrastructure, the last
several years are characterized by accelerating
expansion of private capital attraction in the
management, financing and maintenance of the
airports. There are different forms of private-
public partnership schemes in airport
infrastructure construction – such as
management and lease contracts, concessions,
divestures, and greenfield projects. In 2005 total
investments in airport projects amounted to more
than 7.5 billion USD in the developing
countries.
The practice of private companies to manage
and maintain airports exists since the end of the
previous century in more than 60 countries – 16
EU-members, also Australia, Chile, Thailand,
Russia, Turkey, and India. Two of the most
extensively utilized airports in the world,
Heathrow and Gatwick (London), are fully
privatized and are successfully managed by
private owners.
Penetration of the private sector in maintenance
of airports leads to the following results:
§ Better quality of service of passengers
and clients of the airports;
§ Increased traffic of passengers;
§ Lower airport fees;
§ Development of other activities in the
airports such as trading centers, shops,
restaurants, etc.
Here is what is written on the Internet site of the
Ministry of Transport: “Many surveys show that
through development and modernization, private
operators of airports provide higher quality to
the services. Analysis by the World Bank show
that compared to the state-owned airports,
private operators are able to more than double
the revenues from trade per passenger. These
activities are connected with additional services,
more job places and paying taxes?.
No additional comments are needed.
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Higher Education
Peter Ganev
Recently the parliament voted at first reading the
amendments to the higher education law.
Despite the fact that people are pleading for
greater autonomy for the universities, Bulgarian
lawmakers still fear to take measures that are
more radical in this direction. What is new?
1) Universities will be able to determine the
number of the new students every year
Yes, but the right of the universities to define the
number of the students will be still limited from
the capacity of the university determined by the
National Evaluation and Accreditation Agency
(NEAA). There is no need for such a restriction.
No university will start to accept huge number of
new students only to receive more money from
the budget. Even if they do so, the only result
will be bad education and unfortunately lack of
reputation. Moreover, this means no students in
the future. Why should we give NEAA such an
obligation, when the market itself will force
universities to function properly?!
However, the new law provides some
opportunity for competition among universities,
but only to a certain extent. From now on, the
state subsidy for the universities will depend on
the number of students in each one. Despite this,
there are many unclear points about how exactly
the subsidy will be distributed to universities and
still this system will be far away from the
„voucher system”, where the money follows the
students and thus, greater competition is
established.
2) Universities will be able to determinate
students’ fees
Yes, but the right of the universities to determine
students’ fees will be still limited and should not
exceed “normal” student allowance determined
by the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria. The
main reason for this restriction is the fear that
students’ fees will increase substantially if we
give full freedom to the universities. Yes,
students’ fees will increase, but this will be
determined by the market. Good universities will
raise their fees because they provide higher
quality of education. No university can raise fees
without taking into account the will of the
market.
Something positive is that universities will have
the right to differentiate fees on their own. This
is an opportunity to motivate students, as good
students will pay lower fees or even no fees.
3) Board of Trustees
We can all agree that the first two amendments
are steps in the right direction – giving
universities greater autonomy. Nevertheless, the
idea to create board of trustees by law sounds a
little bit scary. The problem is not in the board
itself. Many universities establish such boards of
trustees on their own to ensure better
management, but these boards do not have a
status of inviolability. These boards will contain
seven members, including one member from the
Ministry of Education. Even if the law says that
this board has no authority and its prerogative
will be just to give standpoints, I thing it’s clear
that such a body will have huge informal power
and it will be easy for its members to interfere in
all stages of university governance. This board
of trustees has nothing to do with the autonomy
of the universities.
4) Students’ Ombudsman
It was just a few years ago when we first heard
of the concept of so-called „Academic
Ombudsman”. Now we are facing the new law
and the new concept of so-called „Students’
Ombudsman”. Besides that students’
ombudsman will be a member of the board of
trustees, he will have the task to improve the
communication between lecturers – students –
administration. It sounds great that the students
will have the opportunity to take part in the
university governance, but this is the main
reason for the existence of students’ council.
Actually, with this law both the “students’
council” and “students’ ombudsman” will be
elected by the students and will have same
duties. However, if the governance of the
university should be well watched, it is better to
leave this duty to the students, not to some
boards of trustees.
“Poor Dear Rector”
Imagine you are a rector of one of the best
universities in Bulgaria and you should make a
decision about students’ fees and the number of
the students you will accept. It is better for you
not to forget that you have been chosen from
your colleagues and you are the only one
responsible for the consequences of your
decisions and the future of the university.
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Despite the fact that your university is one of the
best in the country you have no right to
determine higher fees than all the other
universities and you have serious restrictions on
the number of the new students. All this means
that you have nothing to decide, as everything is
regulated. However, you may fell better if in
front of your door are standing 40 members of
the students’ council, 7 members of the board of
trustees, one students’ ombudsman, one
academic ombudsman and all of them have the
legal right to give you hints.
The Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and
Higher Wages for the Employed Scientists
Veliko Dimitrov
Ever since before elections (local and the ones
for the EU Parliament are now approaching)
civil activities of certain social and professional
groups have been energizing above the average
level. Following the demands for higher wages
of the employees in the transportation sector, the
teachers, the medical personnel and the
pensioners, the state-subsidized Bulgarian
scientists also requested a better paycheck –
higher fixed remuneration in accordance with
the obtained degree and an overall increase in
the state allocated money for science from 0,2%
to 0,33% of GDP.
It is sensitive to be known that all the social
groups listed above have something in common
– their income depends on the state, i.e. on
individual or collective administrative decisions
and in this sense the pre-election period seems to
be at the highest productive. However, within
this category, two qualitatively different types of
subgroups can be specified, namely the ones
who depend on the state under the stress of
circumstances (pensioners) and those for whom
it is a personal choice (all state budgetary funded
workers and officials), i.e. the former does not
and the latter does have a choice.
The following table reveals information about
the financial security of the Bulgarian Academy
of Sciences (BAS) employees over the past two
years and what has been set for the current
financial year.
Budget of the BAS ? thousands of leva
Indicator 2005 2006 2007 Percentage change  2007/2006
1. Revenue 13 000.0 20 000.0 23 000.0 -
2. Expenditures, 74 290. 6 85 240.6 91 098.4 6.86%
    Incl. capital ones 2 154. 0 4 000.0 4 209.2 5.23%
3. Subsidy 61 290. 6 65 090.6 68 098.4 -
Regular employees - 8 408 8 408 0%
Expenditures for one regular employee - 10 139 10 835 6.86%
Source: Report on the State Budget Act for 2006 and 2007, own calculations
As it is evident, the overall expenditure for a
regular employee has been envisaged to increase
by 6.86% on average. The capital expenditures
are supposed to grow less than the current ones,
that also include payments for labor, which
means that the increase of the latter is even over
6.86%.
How far the demands of the BAS scholars as
paid by the budget are grounded?
If we leave aside arguments like “… contribute
for the development of the world science … and
subserve for the growth of intellectual and
material values of the nation” and focus on the
objective economic reality, we shall come to the
following conclusions:
The projected GDP growth for 2007 is about
6%, i.e. if that comes to be a true prognosis, the
colleagues (in the broadest sense) of the BAS
scientists who are employed in the private sector
will create 6% more value than they did in the
previous year. At the same time, even more than
this additional increase in value is supposed to
be redistributed for science, which makes the
relation GDP/expenditures per a regular BAS
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employee change and that in favor of the BAS
scientists.
The question, how much exactly should the state
allocate for “science” has always been highly
controversial not only in Bulgaria. The reality
shows that the stronger the academic lobby is the
more the governments are ready to redistribute
through the budget (which of course applies to
all the others state expenditures as well). At the
same time, it is not immediately clear if the
allocation of more resources (or any at all) is
justified because it always happens by evading
the market mechanism, which on its own has
two major consequences: the created value may
not correspond to what is really needed and
secondly even if there is a relation between
resources allocated and output achieved, it could
be determined in advance only somewhat and
moreover using solely quantitative parameters;
the work of the research units is however to be
measured qualitatively.
As a conclusion, no matter how many resources
the state allocates for science, they will certainly
be never enough in the point of view of the state
scholars. Unlike the pensioners however, as
already stated, the BAS scientists, if not satisfied
with certain conditions, still have a choice and
could start working in the private sector.
*  Here I mean solely the group expression of will on
certain questions because for the moment that is the
main form of manifestation of civil self-awareness
** As stated in the BAS statute
The cycling problem in Sofia
Metodi Lazarov
During the past week the municipal commission
“Youth, Sports and Tourism” approved the
proposal, dealing with the creation of better
terms to ride a bicycle in Sofia. The paper says
that bicycle lanes will be taken into account
when planning new streets as well as when
already constructed streets are undergoing
current repairs. The municipal parliament will be
requiring from Boyko Borissov the creation of a
common scheme for bicycle traffic so that the
implemented map could be published online.
Initially six bicycle lanes are planned to be
introduced which would create a base for cheap,
safe and smooth movement throughout the city
and provide an alternative to using public
transport or cars.
Nicely put in words but hard to be accomplished
in a city where any free space is a potential
parking spot and no political actions are taken to
alleviate the problem on traffic. We have
previously declared that the most effective and
plausible way of “popping” congested cities’
hearts is by introducing and differentiating taxes
on car access. New York, London and Athens
are appropriate examples for explosively
growing cities which concentrate great crowds to
relatively small areas and nevertheless succeed
in coping with the traffic by using the so-called
“congestion pricing”. Taxing traffic, however, is
an unpopular political move and thus, not
expected to be taken soon in Sofia, even though
the construction of a taxation system could be
shifted to the private sector and the municipality
would register no unnecessary expenses. The
negative externalities from traffic jams have
become a serious burden upon our European
capital – excessive loss of time (and the incurred
economic losses), waste of fuel, higher pollution
of the environment, more costs to drivers and the
municipality diverted to  maintenance of cars
and streets. That is why traffic needs to be
mitigated by better management. Examples of
the problems on road include uncoordinated
lights, trash being collected in rush hour and
dangerously behaving drivers.
City traffic could accurately be evaluated in a
mathematical model because of the limited
number of participants and limited freedom of
action. If you look at the classic traffic jam
problem in which six persons are allocated to
seven spots and each one of them hops over the
others to get to the other end, a model of city
traffic would resemble the same concept but
calculated by a more complex function. Imagine
that - three of the participants in our math
example face the other three while being
separated by a free spot – that same way Sofia
daily sees 100,000 cars waiting on a light for
another 100,000 to pass. While the minimum
number of moves of the math problem is fifteen,
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human behavioural studies and traffic load are
only a couple of the subjective terms that could
be quantified and employed in a math model of
Sofia’s traffic.
Seoul tracks cars’ and pedestrians’ traffic in
real-time so that it could coordinate lights and
ease the advance of all participants. Radios,
informing of free routes, are common around the
world and alleviate traffic from busy junctures.
Traffic could also be examined as a social model
besides the already described features of a
possible physical model. Studies show that
changing lanes does not always help your
advance because it is not done on rational
reasons but because of emotional strives of the
typical driver in Sofia. The participant does not
also realize that he himself contributes to the
traffic jam and increases the time span of the
other drivers.
The above mentioned considerations are only
samples of what could be taken into
consideration to ameliorate traffic’s
management. Only after having created a basic
model to predict traffic, the municipality could
start planning for the needs of people riding
bicycles, because a radical and all-embracing
change is needed - not an ineffective reform,
done piece by piece. Market principles would
bring innovation (such as the exampled
management) because the slow transfer through
Sofia is a failure of the governing power which
monopolistically controls the basic service of
transport. Management of Sofia’s traffic needs
to be shifted upon the private sector which
would then introduce taxing mechanisms as the
most effective way of solving this long-term
issue. I am absolutely sure that cycling Sofia
would look much different than any plans of the
municipality. It is simply a question of demand
and supply.
* Donald Redelmeier, of the University of Toronto,
and Robert Tibshirani, of Stanford
Economic Security and Stability in 1989-2005 Bulgaria
By Krassen Stanchev
The attempt to describe the transition from the point of few of economic security is equal to rewriting the
entire history of the last sixteen year of my and other post-communist countries. The reason is that so
little attention has been paid to this aspect of reforms, that the picture looks very different, the life
complicated and uncertain. There are no macroeconomic heroes and industrial champions, the reality
becomes individual, i.e. composed of choices that individuals make, and some presumably insignificant
societal groups become unexpectedly important.
In fact, what I discuss in the lines that follow are cases of spontaneity, economic instability and property
reshuffling that cast light on the history of reforms in Bulgaria. This is not explanation but a different
angle in comparison to mainstream “economics of transition” that looks at such basics as individual
choices and property rights as peripheral constellations of political establishments and privatizations.
I do not have any specific objective in presenting this paper, besides attempting to demonstrate that these
constellations are rather important for the understanding of what happened after the Berlin Wall collapsed
in 1989.
Bulgaria is a good country to look at: but I do not deal with the lucky side of the story, with the years of
growth and incremental prosperity. My subjects are, first of all, constellations around redistribution of
properties. Most of it happened in the past, between late 1980’s and nowadays, but the story is far from
finishing. So, there are no specific lessons about what countries should or should not do, what is the best
or worst practice.
* The full text is available in PDF format here:
http://ime.bg/uploads/docs/f1ebe4_Private_Enforcement.pdf
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